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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (i) (Cum. Supp. 
1994) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I. Did the District Court err in awarding custody of 
the parties' minor children to the Defendant as well as awarding 
alimony to the Defendant inasmuch as the Defendant failed to 
file any answer or counterclaim for custody or alimony? 
Standard of Review. The foregoing issue presents a 
question of law, accordingly, the same is reviewed for 
correctness. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988). 
Issue 2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
District Court's finding that: 
Each of the parties are fit and proper 
persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor children, and 
an award of joint custody is appropriate, 
with the residential custody to be with the 
mother. The court has determined in weighing 
the factors as set forth in Rule 4-903 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration and the other 
factors as presented to the court at trial 
that it would be in the best interest of the 
children to be with the defendant. 
Standard of Review. "Findings of fact . . . shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach [es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Western Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
Issue 3. Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
District Court's finding that: 
The most compelling factor weighing in 
favor of the defendant is a stronger 
willingness on the part of the defendant to 
see that visitation continues with the other 
parent. The court believes that it is very 
appropriate that each of the parties maintain 
their substantial relationship with the 
children including substantial time with the 
children. The court found no indication of 
interference with parental contact on the 
part of the defendant. 
Standard of Review. "Findings of fact . . . shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Under that standard, [appellate courts] do not set aside the 
trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or [the court] otherwise reach[es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Western Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Determinative Law: 
a. Constitutional Provisions: 
b. Statutes: 
c. Case Law: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court on or about November 7, 1995, 
granting custody of the above parties7 minor children to the 
Defendant (R. 216-224). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
1. The Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the 
above captioned matter on July 8, 1994, seeking custody of the 
parties' minor children. (R. 1-3). 
2. The Defendant never filed an answer or counterclaim 
seeking custody of the minor children or an award of alimony. 
(No citation in record). 
3. A trial was held in this matter on July 5-7, 1995. (R. 
208) . 
5. After trial, the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered by the District Court 
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on or about July 31, 1995 addressing all issues except that of 
custody of the minor children. (R. 199-212). 
6. The District Court held a further hearing as to the 
issue of custody on August 10, 1995. (R. 216). 
7. After trial, the court entered Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Order on November 7, 1995. (R. 216-224). 
8. No post-judgment motions were filed. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. The Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the 
above matter on or about July 8, 1994, seeking custody of the 
parties' three minor children. (R. 1-3). 
2. The Defendant never filed any answer to Plaintiff's 
complaint or counterclaim seeking custody of the minor children 
or alimony. This, despite several admonishments from the court 
to file an answer and/or counterclaim. (R. 236-237; 471-473) . 
3. During the pendency of the divorce (approximately 18 
months), the Plaintiff was awarded temporary custody of the 
parties' minor children. (R. 78-79) . 
4. Although the custody evaluator recommended that 
residential custody be vested in Defendant, a psychological 
evaluation commissioned by the custody evaluator recommended 
that the Plaintiff be awarded primary physical custody due to 
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the fitness of the Plaintiff as well as certain character-
ological defects of the Defendant. (R. 760-763). 
5. After trial, the court, without any answer or 
counterclaim on file, awarded the Defendant residential custody 
of the parties' minor children, as well as alimony in the amount 
of $400.00. (R. 216-224). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue 1. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that " [there shall be a complaint and an answer." Rule 
7(a) Utah R. Civ. P. Further, Rule 8(d) of the same rules 
provides that "[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required . . . are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading." Rule 8(d) Utah R. Civ. P. In the instant 
case, the Defendant failed to file an answer to Plaintiff's 
complaint admitting or denying the allegations set forth in 
Plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, Defendant failed to file a 
counterclaim seeking custody of the parties' minor children 
and/or alimony, despite repeated admonishments by the District 
Court. Accordingly, the District Court's award of custody to 
the Defendant as well as the award of alimony was without basis 
in the record and should be overturned. 
Issue 2. The weight of the evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that the Plaintiff was the more fit and appropriate 
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custodian for the minor children; however the court disregarded 
such evidence and awarded custody to the Defendant. Inasmuch as 
the court's finding as to custody was against the clear weight 
of the evidence, such finding should be overturned and the 
custody order should be vacated. 
Issue 3. There was insufficient evidence to support 
the District Court's finding that Defendant be awarded custody 
based on her willingness to facilitate visitation between the 
minor children and the non-custodial parent. Particularly, 
there was no evidence that the Plaintiff purposefully denied the 
Defendant visitation with the minor children; rather, the 
evidence indicated that the only times that visitation was not 
effected was when Defendant diverged from the set schedule and 
failed to give Plaintiff timely notice of visitation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INASMUCH AS DEFENDANT NEVER FILED AN ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SEEKING CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN, 
NOR A COUNTERCLAIM SEEKING CUSTODY AND AN AWARD OF ALIMONY, 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING HER CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN AND 
ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $400.00. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: " [t]here shall be a complaint and an answer[.]" 
Rule 7 Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added) . That rule does not 
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vest any discretion in the district court to waive the filing of 
an answer to the subject complaint, however, such rule is 
jurisdictional and mandates that an answer be on file.1 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff filed his complaint on 
July 8, 1994, however, at no time up to and including the trial 
in this matter, did the Defendant file an answer thereto. At 
the open of trial on July 5, 1995, counsel for the Plaintiff 
represented to the court that custody was not legally at issue 
inasmuch as the Defendant had yet to file any answer or 
counterclaim. Counsel for Defendant responded as follows: 
Your Honor, I would have to look through 
the file. I obviously had assumed that [I 
had filed an answer and counterclaim]. If I 
didn't, it was completely an oversight. I've 
never been requested. There's no notice of 
default and, certainly, the issues are clear 
in this matter. I will be happy, obviously, 
if in fact there was an oversight and I 
Further, Rule 8(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. 
Averments in a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is required. . . 
are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading. 
Rule 8(d) Utah R. Civ. P. 
Pursuant to the above rule, inasmuch as a responsive 
pleading is required under Rule 7 and the Defendant 
failed to deny the allegations contained in Plaintiff's 
complaint, such allegations should be admitted. See 
Stevens v. Collard. 
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didn't file an answer, to file an answer 
today, which I believe the Court, in its 
discretion, could certainly permit. 
(R. 237). 
The Court responded as follows: 
All right. Well, I will anticipate that 
you should file the appropriate documents so 
that the record is complete with your answer 
and counterclaim. 
(R. 237). 
In response to the foregoing, the District Court granted 
Plaintiff's motion for Defendant's leave to file an answer and 
counterclaim. (R. 192) . However, despite such leave, no answer 
or counterclaim was ever filed. 
Finally, on the last day of trial, Defendant had yet to 
file the responsive documents. In fact, when counsel for the 
Plaintiff objected to the court considering the issue of alimony 
inasmuch as Defendant had not filed the appropriate pleadings, 
the court provided: 
I'm not going to rule on whether the 
filing fee should be paid to make the claim. 
If somebody wants to raise a claim before the 
court, they have to pay a filing fee and 
raise the claim. If there's going to be no 
counterclaim, there will be no alimony. I 
don't think I have any jurisdiction over it. 
So there has to be a counterclaim to claim 
it, it seems to me. 
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Well, let me put it this way. I fully 
intend to resolve the question of alimony in 
this action. And if you want to run the risk 
of having a legal pleading deficient and have 
that remain as an issue that could be 
reviewed by an appellate court, I suppose 
that's something you're going to have to do. 
But it would be something where I would be 
put in a position that I may not have 
jurisdiction to lawfully if there is no 
counterclaim filed. 
(R. 471-72) (emphasis added). 
Here, the fact of the matter is that Defendant had every 
opportunity to file an answer and counterclaim, seeking the 
award of custody of the parties' children and/or alimony; 
however, Defendant never filed the responsive documents despite 
repeated promises to file the same. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to file an answer is 
jurisdictional. Further, as provided by the court above, the 
Defendant's failure to file a counterclaim for custody and/or 
alimony was likewise jurisdictional. Accordingly, inasmuch as 
Defendant failed to file an answer to Plaintiff's complaint or 
a counterclaim seeking custody and/or alimony, the district 
court was without jurisdiction to award the Defendant custody of 
the parties' children and alimony in the amount of $400.00.2 
At very minimum, the court below should have stayed 
proceedings to allow the Defendant to file the legally 
mandated responsive pleadings. 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS FIT 
TO BE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN. 
After trial, the District Court found: 
1. Each of the parties are fit and proper persons 
to be awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties' minor children, and an award of joint custody 
is appropriate, with the residential custody to be 
with the mother. 
(R. 216-17). 
In order to challenge a finding, the challenging party must 
"marshall the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
finding [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Haqen v. Haqen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) . (quoting In 
Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); accord 
4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471 
(Utah 1995) . 
In the case at bar, the evidence in support of the 
foregoing finding was as follows: 
First, the Plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] All right. So she 
didn't clean the bedrooms, but was she primarily 
responsible for the rest of the operation of the 
house? 
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A. [By Plaintiff] Yes. 
(R. 327). 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] Was there an 
instance during the marriage when Michelle was 
responsible for providing care for the children that 
she failed to have an appropriate supervisor there to 
take care of the kids? 
A. I do not recall one. 
(R. 329). 
Q. It's true, isn't it, that the majority of 
times that the children went to the doctor or the 
dentist, Michelle took them? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 412). 
John C. Whitehead, Defendant's father testified as follows: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] Okay. How would you 
describe Michelle's interactions with her children? 
A. Well, she is a typical caring, loving mother. 
She has provided that to the three older boys and the 
three younger boys. In spite of the problems with the 
first marriage that dissolved, she took care of those 
boys as a mother should and did. She has, in my view 
and my wife's view, has been a very loving, caring 
mother during these recent problems with--especially 
since Eric's left the home. 
Q. During the time period, let's say the five 
years before their separation, did you have concerns 
that Michelle was ignoring the children or putting her 
needs in front of the children? 
A. Definitely not. Definitely no. 
(R. 451-52). 
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Larene Dimond, Shayla's school teacher testified: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] You indicated that 
when Michelle comes into the room, if Shayla hasn't 
seen that she's there, she goes over and initiates the 
contact. If Shayla sees that her mother comes in, 
does she appear to be happy to see her? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Okay. Do they appear to have a warm, 
nurturing relationship? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Does Michelle appear to be an appropriate 
parent? 
A. As far as I've just observed her in the 
classroom. 
(R. 477). 
Elizabeth Bennett, a friend of the Defendant, testified as 
follows: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] How does Michelle 
seem to get along with the older children? 
A. Good. She's a very supportive mother. She, 
you know, she's always got their friends over there 
and--
Q. Do you have concerns that Michelle is not 
properly supervising any of the children when they're 
there? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have concerns about Michelle's 
parenting abilities? 
A. No. 
Q. What do you believe her strengths are? 
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A. I think her strengths are her kids. 
Q. What are her strengths in terms of her 
parenting abilities? 
A. She's--she's very teaching and she is very 
health conscious. She tries to, you know, keep them 
aware of what they are eating and what is healthy 
and--and exercise is very important. She, you know, 
wants them to grow and achieve as much as they can. 
Q. Are you personally aware of whether Michelle 
helps the kids with their school work, for instance? 
A. Yes, she does. She's very involved with her--
she's helped them with--I can't think of the word--
assignments or reports that they've had to get in, 
she's stayed up nights helping them and, you know, 
when they've had to keep--get them in early in the 
morning or something. 
Q. Are you aware of any instances when Michelle 
has left the children unsupervised or inappropriately 
supervised? 
A. No. 
(R. 520-523). 
Jeaneen Bridgwater, Defendant's neighbor, testified as 
follows: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] [D]id you also 
observe Michelle with the younger kids? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what kind of interaction did she have? 
A. She would play with them, do things with them. 
She was always lovey-dovey with them, very affec-
tionate with them. 
Q. Was she able to set limits for them? 
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A. Yes. There was--like I would go exercising 
with her, or I would be with her in the home and there 
was always rules that they had to follow, you know? 
Q. Were you able to form any kind of conclusion 
as to who, between Eric and Michelle, was more 
involved in the discipline of the children? 
A. I didn't see Eric disciplining at all. But 
then Eric wasn't there very often. He was always 
working. 
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any instances when 
Michelle just left the children and they were 
completely unsupervised? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. All right. Have you observed Michelle with 
the younger children during this separation period? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what has her interaction with them been? 
A. She's very concerned with them, she's very 
worried about their health, nutrition. They've been 
real clingy to her. They seem to cry more because 
they feel like they want to be there with Eric. 
Q. All right. Do you believe that Michelle is a 
good parent? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you believe that Michelle is capable of 
taking care of all six of the kids? 
A. Yes, I do. 
(R. 528-544) . 
Collette Talley, another neighbor of Michelle's, testified: 
Q. And what did you observe of Michelle's 
interactions with the children? 
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A. I had a lot of dealings with Michelle because 
we were in the Primary together and, you know, she 
would bring the younger children with her to our 
presidency meetings and that kind of thing. Michelle 
was always really wonderful with the children. Very 
attentive. And I've never seen her raise her voice or 
be angry with her children. Just a very good mother, 
very loving. 
Q. Did she interact well with them? 
A. On yeah. Very well with them. 
Q. Would you characterize her as someone who 
would put her own needs before those of the children? 
A. No, not--I'm not sure of what kind of things 
we'd be talking about, but over all of the time that 
I've known Michelle, I have seen a great deal of 
concern and care for her children. And I don't 
believe that she would ever put herself above them, 
no. 
(R. 551-57). 
A review of the Exhibit record indicates that the actual 
custody evaluation was never entered into evidence, however, the 
following testimony of Kim Peterson supports the finding in 
question.3 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] Were you able to 
discern from your interviews with Michelle and Eric, 
as well as your interviews with the children, as to 
who had been the primary caretaker of the kids? 
For purposes of his marshalling requirement, Plaintiff 
submits that in addition to the testimony cited, a 
complete review of Kim Peterson's testimony would be 
warranted by this court. 
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A. It is my feeling that it had been Michelle, 
and that was primarily based on the fact that she had 
been mostly home with the children. 
(R. 565). 
Q. Now, that was a pretty long litany of 
characteristics that I don't suppose anybody here is 
going to describe as at the top of the list, the ones 
you'd want applied to yourself. How do you jibe that 
description of psychological characteristics with 
Michelle's ability to function as a parent? 
A. Well, I think they speak more towards her 
problems in close interpersonal relationships with 
adults, but, potentially, could have a very negative 
impact on her ability to parent, particularly the part 
about needing to have relationships with men, being 
more self-centered, self focused. 
If that is not kept in check, potentially, she 
would become neglectful to the degree that I and, I 
think, everybody else in here would be very concerned. 
I have not seen that level of problems. There have 
been some things that she's done. For example, 
keeping the kids home from school on Fridays, which 
hasn't particularly shown good judgment. I think I 
understand why she's done it in terms of missing the 
kids. But, nevertheless, that kind of behavior is not 
in their best interest. 
And relationships with boyfriends, potentially I 
could see her becoming involved to the point that the 
kids are not her first priority. But then again, I 
have not--based on what I have been able to see on 
past reports and her behavior and so forth, it doesn't 
appear as though her involvement has been to the 
extreme where it would have a major negative impact on 
the children. 
Q. What is a more valuable tool in terms of 
trying to predict what kind of a parent is going to be 
in the future, the experience that you can look to of 
the parent over the past 15 years or the results of an 
MMPI and those kinds of personality characteristics 
saying in the future there might be problems. 
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A. Uh-huh. Past behavior is the better predictor 
of future behavior. 
Q. Okay. Now, based upon her past behavior and 
all of the reports that you've been given by Eric and 
the collateral resources and by Michelle and by the 
children, do you believe--do you feel comfortable in 
saying that you believe, in the future, the likelihood 
is that Michelle will continue to be competent care-
taker of her children? 
A. There are certainly risks or possibilities 
that she won't be. But based on what I know of her, 
I would say that she would continue to be an adequate 
parent that will take care of her children, attend to 
their needs, be nurturing, giving them sufficient 
attention and parenting. 
Q. Now first of all, are both Michelle and Eric 
Hogan fit and capable parents to provide parenting to 
these children? 
A. Yes they are. 
Q. If the children were to be placed in the 
custody of their mother, would you anticipate any 
irreversible trauma to the kids from a change of 
primary residency? 
A. No, I would not. It's a home and neighborhood 
that they're familiar with and, certainly, they have 
a very positive relationship with their mother. 
Q. Okay. Now, in this instant situation, what is 
your recommendation with regard to where the children 
ought to be living? 
A. Well, in looking at all of the factors, even 
though I see Eric as being more emotionally stable and 
more fit in many ways, the differences between he and 
Michelle, given the level of bonding that the children 
have with each parent and given her circumstances, I 
don't think that those positive qualities in Eric, his 
greater emotional stability is great enough to warrant 
designating him as being the children's primary 
caregiver. 
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In looking at his circumstance, I certainly don't 
have any problems with him being the primary 
caregiver. But, basically, in looking at her 
circumstances, I see her as being in somewhat of a 
better position to have primary custody or to have her 
home be designated as the children's primary residence 
from which they would have their basic base, from 
where they would attend school and so forth. 
And I'm not making that a real strong recommenda-
tion, because we have to, obviously, take into account 
the other factors that were discussed in this report 
too. And it's not a situation where you have a good 
parent and a bad parent or one is, you know, 
significantly superior than the other. In certain 
respects, she comes out quite a ways ahead and other 
respects, Eric comes out way ahead. 
But when we average all of that stuff together, I 
see it somewhat better the circumstance for the 
primary custody to be with Michelle. 
(R. 363-74) 
Considerable testimony of the Defendant likewise supports 
the finding at issue. Such testimony is located in the record 
from 648-713. 
Finally, for purposes of the marshalling requirement, 
counsel for Defendant proferred certain testimony from Dr. Jay 
Thomas' deposition as follows: 
[By Defendant's counsel] I would indicate that on page 73, 
line 2, I asked him: "Can you state with any certainty that 
Michelle Hogan is an unfit parent? 
"Answer: No, I cannot." 
(R. 765). 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing marshalled evidence, 
Plaintiff shall prove that such did not support the court's 
finding regarding the Defendant's fitness as to custody of the 
minor children.4 
Initially, the Plaintiff testified that he played a primary 
caregiver role to the minor children. (R. 263-275).5 Specifi-
cally, Plaintiff testified that he was the parent who would help 
the children with their homework, would make sure that the 
children attended dance and other lessons, and would get up with 
the children at night. 
Plaintiff requests this court to pay particular note to 
the considerable evidence introduced regarding the 
Defendant's past moral standards, particularly in light 
of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-10(1) (1994), which provides 
in pertinent part: 
If a husband and wife having 
minor children are separated, or 
their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an 
order for the future care and 
custody of the minor children as it 
considers appropriate. In deter-
mining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the 
child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each 
of the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 30-3-10(1) (1994). 
Again, inasmuch as a considerable portion of the 
Plaintiff's testimony goes to fitness, a review of the 
transcript of his testimony is warranted. 
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Further, Plaintiff testified about Defendant's suicide 
attempts. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, has Michelle 
ever talked to you about suicide? 
A. Yes she has. 
Q. When? 
A. The last time was the fall of '94. A couple 
of months before we had--before we separated. Not the 
fall of '94, the spring of '94, excuse me. Maybe late 
winter. We--Michelle told me she'd been thinking 
about--about suicide and she's--she'd expressed those 
feelings several times before in our marriage. 
She told me that she had even gone as far as 
talking to Shayla about it. She had talked to Shayla 
and told Shayla that "Mommy may not always be around" 
but that Mommy loved her. 
(R. 303). 
Further, the Plaintiff testified about numerous extra-
marital affairs in which Defendant was involved. During several 
of said affairs, the minor children were present. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, we talked 
earlier about the fact about her involvement with the 
men. Is there a time when she had--that you observed 
that she had any one of the children with her when she 
was being involved with a man? 
A, Yes, there were. The day I watched her making 
out with the bodybuilder, she had our child with her 
in the van. She was sitting in his lap and she was 
all over him. And he was asleep for most of it, but 
he woke up--
Q. The child? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Not the bodybuilder. Let's get the definition 
as to who was asleep. 
A. The child was asleep through most of it. 
Towards the end, he woke up, Michelle held him for a 
minute and then strapped him back into his seat and 
continued to make out with Kendall. 
Q. Have you known of other times when she's taken 
the children with her to rendezvous with another 
fellow? 
A. I know--yes, I do. She had a picnic with one 
guy. He brought his kids, she brought hers. They had 
a picnic together. 
303-04) . 
Helen Hogan, the Plaintiff's mother, testified as follows: 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Would you describe 
Eric's relationship with the children? 
A. He's a loving father. He's always concerned 
about them. He spends a lot of time, in fact, all of 
his time with them, when he is home. He plays with 
them, interacts with them. He talks to them and reads 
to them at night. We have family prayers together and 
read scriptures together before they go to bed. Have 
home evening. Takes them to church. 
Q. Ma'am, has he given the responsibility of 
taking care of these children when he's home to you or 
does he do it? 
A. He does not. 
Q. Have you seen Eric try to solve problems with 
the children? 
A. Yes, and he's very good with solving problems. 
442-44). 
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John C. Whitehead, Defendant's father, further attested to 
Plaintiff's parental fitness. When asked what he believed the 
Plaintiff's strengths were, he responded "Well, I love Eric too. 
I think he is a loving father. I think he's a competent 
father." (R. 453) . 
Larene Dimond, Shayla's teacher, testified that Shayla had 
considerable absences when she was in her mother's custody. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Ma'am in regards to 
that, what days is it that Shayla usually has missed 
when she's missed days? 
A. Mostly on Fridays. 
Q. And what is the reason for that; do you know? 
A. The only thing that I know about Fridays is 
that she is with her mother. 
(R. 474). 
Moreover, several neighbors of the parties testified 
regarding the Plaintiff's fitness and the Defendant's lack 
thereof. Alisa Madill testified that she "was always impressed 
with [Eric's] involvement, the coaching teams, the playing out 
in the front yard. And, again, that was mostly Eric with that 
or the grandfathers working with them on scout projects or 
mother--Eric' s mom teaching piano, things like that." (R. 480) . 
She further testified that "when [Michelle] decides to do things 
and she does it for show. And it isn't--the center of attention 
is drawn to herself. When there are activities that we go 
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together for the kids, Michelle's the person who wants the 
center of attention, not so much her kids." (R. 481). Ms. 
Madill also testified that the Defendant had phoned her and 
discussed suicide. (R. 481-83). Finally, she testified that 
Shayla, the minor child, had come to her home one evening at 
approximately 11:00 p.m. and reported that her mother had left 
her alone. (R. 256). In responding to her concerns about the 
Defendant, she stated "Consistency in parenting, blaming. When 
children do things wrong, blaming other people for what they do 
wrong. Then the environment that she creates with other men." 
(R. 491). 
Paula Jensen, another neighbor, testified: 
I think Eric is a unique father. All fathers love 
their children and have a desire to be with their 
children to some extent. But I think Eric is a lot 
like a mother too. He--he loves them and wants to be 
with them and would take care of them. He takes care 
of them. He's a good example, good provider, works 
hard. 
(R. 503) . 
With regard to the Defendant, Ms. Jensen stated: 
I don't think [Michelle's] a very good 
housekeeper. The kids often, I felt like, were not as 
well taken care of as they should have been. She 
liked being affectionate. I thought the bad part of 
that was she was very physical with other people, 
especially men. 
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I don't think [Michelle] would take as good a care 
of them. I don't think she would be able to provide 
for them, physically as well as mentally, as well as 
Eric could emotionally. 
(R. 504). 
Cassandra Wahlstrom, another neighbor, testified that she 
had no concerns about Eric receiving custody of the parties' 
minor children. (R. 514) . However, she did voice concerns 
about the Defendant. Specifically, she was concerned that the 
Defendant "doesn't spend enough time with the kids. They are 
always angry. They need a lot more support. I don't think she 
can provide it right now." (R. 515). 
Finally, Josef Mark Dickes, testified that he was involved 
with the Defendant when he was only 17 and that the minor child, 
Shayla, walked in on he and the Defendant when they were 
kissing. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Joe, were you ever 
involved with Michelle Hogan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Sir, during any particular time, were you 
involved in kissing her and the child, Shayla, walked 
in on the two of you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did that occur? 
A. Front room of their house. 
Q. What was your age at the time, Joe? 
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A. 17. 
Q. What's your age now? 
A. 22. 
(R. 743). 
Most importantly, the professionals who testified in this 
case testified at length regarding the Plaintiff's overall 
strengths and Defendant's characterological defects and how such 
defects would affect Defendant's fitness and ability to parent 
the minor children. First, a review of Kim Peterson's testimony 
reveals that a principal factor in his evaluation was that 
Michelle was home during the day.6 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, I want to get 
to the very bottom line on the recommendations, then 
move backwards, if I may. 
Your assumption is basing it is because Michelle 
being home; isn't that correct? 
A. That is a major factor, yes. 
Q. In fact, that's probably the major factor, of 
her being able to be home, is it not, sir? 
A. Well, that is a major factor but it's taken in 
the context of the fact that her basic parenting has 
been very adequate. 
Provided the importance of the custody evaluator's 
testimony, the Plaintiff again requests this court's 
indulgence in reviewing the transcript of his testimony 
inasmuch as Plaintiff cannot possibly relate all 
dispositive testimony in the body of this brief. 
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Q. What if Eric were able to have his job change 
and he's at home, he's providing personal care for 
Andrew at that point?7 
A. Under those circumstances, that would put him 
in a better position, since he already has custody and 
since his psychological functioning is better. I 
guess the question I would have, though, is, you know, 
what would be the circumstances of that employment. 
You know, how much time would he actually have to 
parent? 
(R. 608-609). 
Kim Peterson also testified: 
[Michelle] minimizes her behavior in [accepting 
responsibility] and she projects blame onto Eric for 
her behavior, believing that if he had been more 
emotional or a better communicator, more sensitive, 
that she would not have had that need. 
(R. 616) . 
In addition to the Plaintiff being more psychologically 
stable than the Defendant (R. 609), Kim Peterson also testified 
that Eric was more involved than an average father. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] If we might put it in 
terms of context of a normal father, was he more 
involved with these children than what a normal father 
would be? 
A. I'd say he's probably more involved than 
average. 
(R. 619). 
In fact, the Plaintiff testified at trial that he had 
procured new employment where he would indeed be working 
out of his home. (R. 298). 
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The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory for both 
parties was made part of the court record. (R. 22-24). With 
regard to the Plaintiff, the profile provided as follows: 
Symptomatic Pattern 
This MMPI profile is within normal limits, 
suggesting that the client is reporting no serious 
psychological problems. He seems to have no 
unmanageable psychological conflicts or threatening 
stressors at this time, and his personal adjustment 
appears to be adequate. He seems to be dealing 
effectively with situational demands and is obtaining 
satisfaction out of his life. He appears to have no 
sex-role conflicts. 
Interpersonal Relations 
Quite outgoing and sociable, he has a strong need 
to be around others. Although he is gregarious and 
effective at gaining recognition from others his 
personal relationships may be somewhat superficial. 
He appears to be rather spontaneous and expressive and 
may manipulate others, especially to gain social 
status. He may be impulsive at times and act without 
sufficient forethought. 
With respect to the Defendant, the profile provided: 
Symptomatic Pattern 
Individuals with this MMPI profile tend to be 
chronically maladjusted. Narcissistic and rather 
self-indulgent, the client is somewhat dependent and 
demands attention from others. She appears to be 
rather hostile and irritable and tends to resent 
others. 
She has great trouble showing anger and may 
express it in passive-aggressive ways. She may have 
a problem with acting out behavior and may have 
experienced difficulty with her sexual behavior in the 
past. She tends to blame her own difficulties on 
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others and refuses to accept responsibility for her 
own problems. 
Interpersonal Relations 
She is experiencing great difficulty in her social 
relationships, and feels that others do not understand 
her and do not give her enough sympathy. She is 
somewhat aloof, cold, non-giving, and uncompromising, 
and attempts to advance herself at the expense of 
others. She may have a tendency to be verbally 
aggressive toward her husband when he feels 
frustrated. She seems to have a poor marital 
adjustment. 
Behavioral Stability 
This profile reflects a pattern of long-standing 
poor adjustment. Her anger may produce periods of 
intense interpersonal difficulty. 
Diagnostic Considerations 
An individual with this profile is usually viewed 
as having a Personality Disorder, such as a Passive-
Aggressive or Paranoid personality. The possibility 
of a Paranoid Disorder should be considered, however, 
individuals with this profile tend not to seek 
psychological treatment on their own, and they are 
usually not good candidates for psychotherapy. They 
resist psychological interpretation, argue and tend to 
rationalize and blame others for their problems. In 
addition, they frequently leave therapy prematurely. 
(R. 22-24) . 
Dr. Jay Thomas was commissioned by Kim Peterson to perform 
psychological evaluations on each of the parties. Certain 
relevant portions of his deposition were read into evidence. 
[Plaintiff's counsel] Line 7: "Sir, in all of 
your particular testimony, did it show that Eric 
could--was dealing appropriately with his feelings and 
emotions? 
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"Answer: From an ideal, it would have been nice 
for him to have more emotional awareness. From the 
more stereotypical male way of handling things through 
problem solving, he was very normal. I do not see 
avoidance, I do not see denial. I did not see what I 
would consider externalization of responsibility. So 
in that sense, yes, he was reasonable and fairly 
normal." 
"How about Michelle?", was the question. 
"Answer: I had concerns because of the 
inconsistencies and the way she presented to me, both 
clinically as well as testing, where there was 
indications of no anxiety, but a good deal of anxiety 
where she was wanting to develop a relationship with 
me where I would support her and reassure her. That's 
considered either poor boundaries or poor developed 
sense of herself of distinguishing what's reasonable 
and what's appropriate for a situation." 
"Sir, did either one of these people--would you 
consider them to be psychologically healthy?" 
"Answer: They appear to be." 
"Question: Okay. How about physiologically" 
"I would have concerns about Michelle," is 
the answer. 
"Question: Okay. What are those concerns?" 
"Answer: My concerns are as she displays a number 
of what are considered features of personality 
disorder. I will not make a diagnosis of a formal 
disorder because my evaluation was not tentatively a 
differential diagnostic evaluation. And so I could 
not comprehensively or systematically address the 
dimensions of a personality disorder. But there were 
degrees of self-absorption, degrees of poor impulse 
control or immediate-need gratification." 
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"Other qualities that would suggest some degree of 
narcissistic personality features or some histrionics 
personality features, where someone wants inordinate 
amounts of attention, affection, caretaking." 
"Okay. It would be for the final determination of 
the Court, but do you have conclusions from one 
point--it should be one parent, I don't know at this 
point, over the other in regards to an ability to parent 
these children?" 
"Answer: Based solely on the psychological 
testing and as that information was made available to 
me, my clinical judgment would be that Eric would have 
more stability and predictability and general 
appropriateness to parent these children." 
(R. 760-63). 
Nina Parker Cohen, an Assistant Professor in the Department 
of Pediatrics at the University of Utah Medical School, 
testified regarding how those characterological defects detected 
by Dr. Jay Thomas would affect one's ability to parent. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Ma'am, I'm going to 
ask you in regards to some items. If a parent has 
items where they are emotionally needy, immature and 
self-focused, how does that affect the children? 
A. Yes. Again, in the abstract. Those kind of 
characteristics could lead to possible neglect of the 
children, children's needs, both emotional and 
physical. Really a whole variety of things, but that 
would be one of my major concerns, given those kinds 
of characteristics. 
Q. If a person has a characteristic where they're 
deemed to be basically narcissistic in their 
personality, how does that relate to their ability to 
parent a child? 
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The definition of the characteristics that we 
typically think of when we think about narcissism 
would be an individual who is very immature, very 
self-centered, very focused, uses other individuals to 
kind of mirror and fulfill kind of their own sense of 
self, and constantly needy of attention from others. 
Now, if--I mean--and the question that you asked 
then was how could that affect parenting. Once again, 
if you have an individual like that who would be very 
insensitive to the needs of others, to their children, 
that could lead to possible neglect. 
(R. 356-58). 
Kent D. McDonald, a clinical director at Sandy Counseling 
Center, reviewed Mr. Peterson's custody evaluation and disagreed 
with the conclusions and recommendations therein. He testified: 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Okay. In regards to 
the report, what is the appropriate way in which these 
items are supposed to be prepared? 
A. According to court rules, the first item of 
consideration is whether or not the children are happy 
and well cared for in their current custodial 
situation. 
Q. And in regards to that, what did you--what 
information did you get in regards to the children in 
regards to that particular situation? 
A. From my reading, it appeared that they were 
happy and well cared for in their present situation. 
Q. What is the next item that you look for in 
evaluation? 
A. Excuse me. When we look for an evaluation, 
one of the things we're looking for is the best 
interest of the children in terms of are they--is 
there some kind of something in the mental or 
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emotional makeup of either parent that is likely to be 
detrimental to the well-being of the children. 
Q. And in regards to that, what was found in 
regards to the mental makeup being of these parties? 
A. It referred to each of them as having certain 
emotional deficits which would be detrimental to 
taking care of the children. 
Q. Were you concerned about the evaluation in 
regards to the opinions as opined by Mr. Peterson? 
A. I think what I said at the time was that, 
given the same information, I would have leaned the 
other direction. 
Q. Meaning what? 
A. Meaning that this, like many custody 
evaluations, shows that neither parent is perfect and 
that given the fact that the children appeared to be 
doing fairly well where they were, I would probably 
have leaned to leave them where they were. 
Q. Were you concerned about the portrayal about 
the role model as referred by in Mr. Peterson's report 
of the defendant? 
A. It appeared that the role model was not 
terribly stable. 
Q. Of whom? 
A. Of Mrs. Hogan. 
Q. Did you have any other concerns about the 
report of Mr. Peterson? 
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A. My feeling was that there were obviously some 
things he had seen that were not in the report. 
Because based on the report, which is all I say, I 
would have come to a different conclusion. 
(R. 343-47). 
Finally, Jerry Gardner, a therapist, who had met with the 
parties on a regular basis, submitted a letter to the court (R. 
824-25) , which letter had previously been made part of the court 
record. It provided: 
I have seen both parties on a regular basis, 
consequent to these sessions and test evaluations I 
would conclude that Mr. Hogan has the stability and 
parenting skills superior to Ms. Hogan. Ms. Hogan's 
test profiles are particularly disturbing. She would 
benefit from comprehensive psychotherapy to reach the 
destructive impulses responsible for her narcissism 
and immaturity. Until this can be accomplished it may 
be beneficial for the children to be with their 
father. 
(R. 25). 
The foregoing testimony and evidence conclusively 
demonstrates that the clear weight of the evidence did not 
support the finding that the Defendant was a fit and proper 
person to be awarded primary/residential custody of the parties' 
minor children. Rather, the clear weight of the evidence 
demonstrates that the Defendant was not a fit parent to be 
awarded custody based on consistent poor judgment in relating to 
the minor children and ongoing conspicuous relationships with 
other men in front of the minor children. More dispositive, 
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however, is the overwhelming and uncontroverted testimony 
regarding the Defendant's profound characterological defects and 
emotional stability including self-centeredness and narcissism 
which certainly affects her ability to parent the minor 
children. 
Conversely, the cited evidence demonstrates that while the 
Plaintiff may have certain weaknesses, he possesses no 
characterological or personality defects that would affect his 
parenting. Instead, the testimony overwhelmingly shows that he 
has been a strong source of emotional support and stability to 
the minor children throughout their lives. Accordingly, the 
court's finding that the Defendant is a fit person to be awarded 
the primary custody of the children should be reversed as should 
the ultimate conclusion flowing from that finding. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT "THE MOST COMPELLING 
FACTOR WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT [HAVING CUSTODY] 
IS A STRONGER WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT 
TO SEE THAT VISITATION CONTINUES WITH THE OTHER PARENT." 
In the present case, the District Court found that: 
h. [T] he most compelling factor weighing in favor 
of the defendant is a stronger willingness on the part 
of the defendant to see that visitation continues with 
the other parent. The court believes that is very 
appropriate that each of the parties maintain their 
substantial relationship with the children, including 
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substantial time with the children. The court found 
no indication of interference with parental contact on 
the part of the defendant. 
(R. 218-19). 
In order to challenge a finding, the challenging party must 
"marshall the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
finding [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'11 
Haqen v. Haqen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) . (quoting In 
Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); accord 
4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471 
(Utah 1995) . 
In the instant action, the only evidence to support the 
above finding is the testimony of the Defendant. 
Q. [By Counsel for Defendant] Have you been 
regular in exercising your visitation? 
A. [By Defendant] Yes, I have. I've tried extra 
also, but his mother and Eric refuse to let me do 
that. 
Q. On how many occasions have you asked for extra 
time with the children? 
A. Well, at first I was so worried about the 
children's trauma and my trauma, of course, but their 
trauma. I'd been their caretaker for all their lives, 
and I was just really worried about their welfare, 
their routine. I'm the only one that knows their 
routine and what they like. And so I tried to go over 
just to drop by and because the children would cry, 
his mother said, "I don't think you should come over 
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any more. It's too hard on the kids." Well of 
course it's hard on the kids. I thought it was better 
that they see me than not. 
Q. Have you had--what was the understanding in 
what weeknight you were going to be given visitation? 
A. My understanding has always been that it was 
any night of the weeknight. And I discussed that with 
Eric many times, as he said, "we did discuss it." But 
he left out the part that we discussed that it could 
be any night of the week. And he said, "well, I have 
to know a certain night I can always count on." 
I said, "Well, as far as I know, Thursday is okay." 
But occasionally, I had conflicts and occasionally he 
would not let me see them at all because of those 
conflicts. 
Q. How far in advance would you call him and ask? 
A. Two days. 
Q. What was his response to that? 
A. "That's not long enough notice." 
Q. Would he tell you why it wasn't long enough 
notice? I mean, did they have--did he indicate--
A. No. No. "I have plans too," he would say. 
"That's not long enough notice." I thought two days 
was being--long enough notice. 
(R. 692) . 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Defendant subsequently 
acknowledged that she had consistent visitation with the 
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children on Thursday evenings8. She further acknowledged that 
she did not even exercise the court ordered visitation. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Ma'am let's talk 
about your visitation. You say that you've tried or 
wanted extra visitation, correct? 
A. [By Defendant] Yes. 
Q. The order that's available says that you're to 
have one weeknight each week. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've only exercised one every other week, 
haven't you? 
A. No. 
Q. You've been there every week? You get a 
Thursday evening--
A. Right. 
Q. --through Sunday. 
A. Right. So that's that week. 
Q. And the following week--
A. I get them another night, yes. So I have them 
every--I see them every Thursday night almost. 
Q. The order actually provides that you have 
another weeknight during that week. 
A. No. I believe, it's my understanding, I have 
them from Thursday through Sunday of one week, and one 
weeknight during the next week. That would give me an 
Defendant's testimony on its face demonstrates that the 
Plaintiff did not interfere with visitation between the 
Defendant and the parties' minor children. 
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extra night during the week I have them already. That 
wouldn't make sense. 
Q. Just for quick reading. 
A. I see my children as much as I can. 
Q. Ma'am, I'm reading from a minute entry from 
which the order was prepared from Mr. Atherton. "The 
Plaintiff be awarded the primary physical custody, 
subject to defendant's right to liberal visitation or 
alternate weekends, from Thursday at 6:00 p.m. through 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and one evening each week from 
5:00 p.m. till 8:00 p.m.". 
You didn't exercise that other date, then did you? 
A. Nobody ever made it clear that that was the 
case. I had enough trouble getting them on the days 
we thought I actually saw--
(R. 733) (emphasis added). 
Conversely, the Plaintiff testified as follows with respect 
to visitation: 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, have you had 
any problems with Michelle in regards to getting the 
scheduling between the two of you handled in regards 
to the children and--
A. [By Plaintiff] A great deal of trouble. 
Q. Okay. What is the nature of that problem? 
A. The court allows every other weekend, Thursday 
through Saturday, plus one weeknight. We set up 
Thursday night to be that weeknight. Originally, 
Shayla had dance on Thursday and Michelle wanted to 
take the kids on Thursday, so dance was moved till 
Wednesday. 
I--I scheduled T-Ball practices for Wednesday so 
Michelle could take them on Thursday. I scheduled my 
church meeting for Thursday night because I assumed 
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the kids would be gone. We worked everything so that 
Michelle could take the kids on Thursday nights. 
A couple of months ago, Michelle stated saying she 
didn't want it, she couldn't take them on Thursday 
nights any more, she had other things to do. Her 
exact statement was "I have my own life now and I can 
pick up the kids any time I want." 
Several times I tried to talk with Michelle about 
our schedule and tried to explain that we need to have 
a schedule also. My parents wanted to go to their 
Utah Pioneers meeting on Thursday nights. We'd set 
everything up so that the kids would be gone. 
Michelle wanted to take them on different nights. She 
had other things to do. 
Because we've had a lot of trouble and I tried 
many times to talk to Michelle about it, you know, 
that we need to have a schedule, we need to be able to 
plan. And Michelle would call me and start to yell 
and swear and hang up. A common response is, "well, 
I'm going to call my attorney, and she's going to call 
your attorney and it will just cost you money." 
-We have not been able to--Michelle calls and wants 
to take them on a different night. I don't tell her 
she can't take them. I try and talk to her about 
giving us more notice or setting a schedule, and she 
gets mad and hangs up without ever resolving it. 
(R. 278-280). 
Q. Have you had a time recently where Michelle 
didn't even pick the kids up on her Thursday? 
A. It's not recently. It's been a few months, 
several months ago. The kids were ready to go at 
5:00. At 5:30, we called Michelle and asked her when 
she was coming. My parents were gone, I was getting 
ready to leave. Michelle indicated that she would not 
be coming that night, that she had--she would be--she 
was staying at home but she had things to do, and that 
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she would not be picking them up that night. Both 
kids sat at the table and bawled. 
Q. Did she inform you previously that she wasn't 
going to pick up the children? 
A. No, she did not. As a result, I stayed home 
from my church meeting and stayed with the kids. 
(R. 290-92). 
On cross examination, the Plaintiff further testified: 
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] Now, she's still 
exercising visitation on Thursday, isn't she? 
A. No, she is not. 
Q. What night does she exercise her visitation? 
A. She tries to get them another night. 
Q. Pardon? 
A. She has them every other week from Thursday 
through Sunday. That night, she does take them on 
Thursday. On the other Thursdays, the last several 
months, she has not wanted to take them on Thursday. 
She's wanted to take them on other nights. 
Q. Has she taken them on other nights? 
A. Yes, she has. 
Q. Has she regularly visited with the children at 
least one night during the week? 
A. Except for a few times that were missed, yes. 
(R. 408) . 
Finally, at the further hearing on August 10, 1995, the 
Plaintiff testified that the Defendant had refused to allow him 
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reasonable visitation during the interim period between the 
initial three days of trial and the final hearing. 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, during this 
interim time since we were last here, what visitation 
have you had with the children? 
A. Every other weekend and one weeknight. 
Q. And, sir have you requested additional 
visitation from Michelle? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And what has been her response? 
A. I asked Michelle if I could have them for 
another week. They've been off-track for six weeks. 
I had them for the first week. Then the court 
decision was made. Michelle has had them since. I 
asked if I could have them for another week, and she 
said she would need to speak to her attorney and she 
would not let them--me take them for another week. So 
she's had them for five weeks. I had them for the 
first week. 
Q. Sir, have you had any trouble in regards to 
the visitation that has occurred between the two of 
you, in regards to pickup, drop-offs or any other 
items? 
A. That has always been the case. It has always 
been a very tough situation. 
(R. 598-99). 
Defendant's self-serving statements that the Plaintiff 
interfered with visitation by denying untimely requests for 
alternate visitation is insufficient to support the district 
court's finding that there was a "stronger willingness on the 
part of the defendant to see that visitation continues with the 
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other parent." This is particularly true in light of 
Defendant's subsequent admission that she had regular visitation 
on Thursday evenings, which testimony was corroborated by that 
of the Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff's testimony that the only 
time he was inflexible with regard to visitation was when the 
children had scheduled activities was uncontroverted. 
Accordingly, such finding should be stricken as baseless. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as the court explicitly prescribed that 
such finding was the most compelling factor in determining 
custody, the court's award of custody of the parties' minor 
children to the Defendant should be vacated and this issue be 
remanded to the district court for more appropriate and 
factually based findings on the custody issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this court should reverse the 
District Court's award of custody of the parties' minor children 
to the Defendant as well as its award of alimony to the 
Defendant and remand this case to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with evidence and the record herein. 
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DATED this/_£_T"day of June, 1996 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
MITCHELL J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the __z^£^aay of June, 1996, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, postage prepaid thereon to: 
Ann L. Wassermann 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
—T^ZJuJi f / °^~~ 
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-1300 
Fax: (801) 539-8236 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
aa.o\%43 %-3-cfe-%asi<wv, 
Case No. 944902846DA 
Judge David S. Young 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for Trial before the 
Honorable David S. Young, Judge of the above entitled court 
commencing on the 5th day of July and continuing thereafter to the 
7th day of July, 1995. The plaintiff was present and represented 
by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The defendant was 
present and represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann. 
The court having previously having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and now based upon such and for good cause 
appearing herein 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties and 
the same shall become final upon entry, 
2. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the 
children. During the time period of July 8, 1995 to August 10, 
1995 the children shall reside with the defendant, A determination 
by the court of the children's primary residence shall be reviewed 
and determined by the court on August 10, 1995 at the hearing to be 
held on that date at 8:00 a.m. The parties may supplement to the 
court any additional matters which they deem relevant for the 
determination of residential custody at the hearing on August 10, 
1995. Neither party is to discuss the matter with the children or 
to coax the children in any form or fashion during this interim. 
The plaintiff shall have visitation to the parties' minor children 
which shall be liberal visitation and something greater but not 
less than that as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35. 
3. The defendant is awarded the home and residence of the 
parties subject to the plaintiff's lien owing against the residence 
of one-half (1/2) of the equity of the home which is to be 
determined from the fair market value of the home of $94,000.00 
less the outstanding mortgage balance owing as of July 7, 1995. 
The plaintiff's one-half (1/2) equity share shall be due and owing 
upon the first of the following conditions to occur: 
a. defendant's remarriage 
b. defendant's co-habitation 
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c. defendant selling the home or no longer using the 
home as her primary residence 
d. the youngest of the parties' minor children reaching 
the age of 18. 
4. Each of the parties are to bear and be responsible for 
their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
5. The personal property of the parties is divided as follow: 
To the plaintiff: 
Coleman stove 
Coleman lantern (from wedding) 
Coleman lantern (from Brett) 
Ice Chest (from wedding) 
Other large Ice Chest 
Pup Tent 
TV 
Grandfather's Tool Chest 
Tools from Grandfather 
Gravy Bowl 
To the defendant: 
VCR 
Bookcase 
Bookcase 
Couch 
Loveseat 
Wheat Grinder 
Vacuum 
Piano 
Food Storage 
Blue Ice Chest (from wedding) 
Orange Drink Cooler 
Dome Tent 
Washing Machine 
Dryer 
Computer and Desk 
Answering Machine 
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Volley Ball Poles 
Bed that came from Defendant's Parents 
Household tools 
Gardening tools 
Encyclopedia 
To the children: 
Beds 
Dressers 
Toys 
Clothes 
The child Dustin from defendant's prior marriage is 
allowed to use the trombone that belongs to plaintiff's father 
however, if said child ever stops taking band or is no longer in 
need of the trombone it is to be returned to the plaintiff 
immediately. 
6. The debts incurred during the course of the marriage are 
reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. The issue of alimony 
is reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. 
7. During the interim time period to the August 10, 1995 
hearing, the plaintiff is to maintain the payment on the mortgage 
of approximately $490.00, the van payment of approximately $186.00 
and to pay a one time lump sum amount of $500.00 for child support. 
These amounts as paid herein by the plaintiff may be adjusted by 
the court and appropriately modified at the hearing to be held 
August 10, 1995. 
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8. The plaintiff shall maintain the insurances for medical 
and dental coverage as it may be made available to him through his 
employment. The insurance coverage as presently to be maintained 
by the defendant is through COBRA at a cost of approximately 
$400.00 per month for and on behalf of the parties' minor children. 
The responsibility of the any insurance premium shall be determined 
at the August 10, 1995 hearing. Each party shall pay one-half 
(1/2) of all reasonable and necessary non-covered medical, dental, 
orthodontic, optical and prescription costs which are incurred on 
behalf of the parties' minor children. If the defendant has 
available to her through any employment which she obtains insurance 
coverage for and on behalf of the parties' minor children then she 
shall provide the same. 
9. All of the matters are reserved and shall be adjudicated 
by the court on August 10, 1995 at 8:00 a.m. 
DATED this 3/ ^ ^ay^of July, 1995. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DATED JULY 31. 1995 
RANDY S. LUDLOW #2 011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00 
Fax: (801) 539-8236 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 944902846DA 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for Trial before the 
Honorable David S. Young, Judge of the above entitled court 
commencing on the 5th day of July and continuing thereafter to the 
7th day of July, 1995. The plaintiff was present and represented 
by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The defendant was 
present and represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann. 
The court having received evidence including custody evaluations 
and related reports, taken testimony from numerous witnesses and 
the parties as well as the court receiving arguments from counsel 
and based upon such and for good cause appearing herein the court 
makes these its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah and have been for more than three months immediately prior to 
the commencement of this action• 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on July 12, 1986 in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have arisen between the parties making continuation of 
the marriage impossible. 
4. The parties have had born as issued to them three (3) 
children, to wit: Shayla Cherie Hogan, born April 11, 1987; Keith 
Clark Hogan, born May 12, 1989; and Andrew Eric Hogan, born May 18, 
1993. It is appropriate and just that the parties be awarded the 
joint legal custody of the parties' minor children. For the time 
period from July 8, 1995 until August 10, 1995, the children shall 
reside with the defendant. 
5. The plaintiff has been providing medical and dental 
insurance coverage as available to him through his employment for 
and on behalf of the parties' minor children. The plaintiff has 
obtained new employment and there will not be insurance coverage 
immediately available to him through the employment. The plaintiff 
will be maintaining insurances on behalf of the parties' minor 
children through COBRA. The costs for the insurance coverage on 
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behalf of the parties' minor children is approximately the sum of 
$400.00 per month. 
6. The plaintiff has obtained new employment from which she 
will be receiving the sum of approximately $2,800.00 per month. 
The defendant has not sought employment on a full-time basis and 
the court does not believe that it is appropriate for the defendant 
to not seek and obtain full-time employment. 
7. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired a 
home and real property which home has a value of approximately 
$94,000.00. 
8. The parties have acquired items of personal property 
through the course of the marriage. 
9. The parties have acquired debts and obligations during the 
course of the marriage. 
10. Each of the parties have acquired attorney's fees as a 
result of this action. 
WHEREFORE, the court having made its Findings of Fact, now 
makes these its: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties and 
the same shall become final upon entry. 
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2. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the 
children. During the time period of July 8, 1995 to August 10, 
1995 the children shall reside with the defendant. A determination 
by the court of the children's primary residence shall be reviewed 
and determined by the court on August 10, 1995 at the hearing to be 
held on that date at 8:00 a.m. The parties may supplement to the 
court any additional matters which they deem relevant for the 
determination of residential custody at the hearing on August 10, 
1995. Neither party is to discuss the matter with the children or 
to coax the children in any form or fashion during this interim. 
The plaintiff shall have visitation to the parties' minor children 
which shall be liberal visitation and something greater but not 
less than that as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35. 
3. The defendant is awarded the home and residence of the 
parties subject to the plaintiff's lien owing against the residence 
of one-half (1/2) of the equity of the home which is to be 
determined from the fair market value of the home of $94,000.00 
less the outstanding mortgage balance owing as of July 7, 1995. 
The plaintiff's one-half (1/2) equity share shall be due and owing 
upon the first of the following conditions to occur: 
a. defendant's remarriage 
b. defendant's co-habitation 
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c. defendant selling the home or no longer using the 
home as her primary residence 
d. the youngest of the parties' minor children reaching 
the age of 18. 
4. Each of the parties are to bear and be responsible for 
their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
5. The personal property of the parties is divided as follow: 
To the plaintiff: 
Coleman stove 
Coleman lantern (from wedding) 
Coleman lantern (from Brett) 
Ice Chest (from wedding) 
Other large Ice Chest 
Pup Tent 
TV 
Grandfather's Tool Chest 
Tools from Grandfather 
Gravy Bowl 
To the defendant: 
VCR 
Bookcase 
Bookcase 
Couch 
Loveseat 
Wheat Grinder 
Vacuum 
Piano 
Food Storage 
Blue Ice Chest (from wedding) 
Orange Drink Cooler 
Dome Tent 
Washing Machine 
Dryer 
Computer and Desk 
Answering Machine 
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Volley Ball Poles 
Bed that came from Defendant's Parents 
Household tools 
Gardening tools 
Encyclopedia 
To the children: 
Beds 
Dressers 
Toys 
Clothes 
The child Dustin from defendant's prior marriage is 
allowed to use the trombone that belongs to plaintiff's father 
however, if said child ever stops taking band or is no longer in 
need of the trombone it is to be returned to the plaintiff 
immediately. 
6. The debts incurred during the course of the marriage are 
reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. The issue of alimony 
is reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. 
7. During the interim time period to the August 10, 1995 
hearing, the plaintiff is to maintain the payment on the mortgage 
of approximately $490.00, the van payment of approximately $186.00 
and to pay a one time lump sum amount of $500.00 for child support. 
These amounts as paid herein by the plaintiff may be adjusted by 
the court and appropriately modified at the hearing to be held 
August 10, 1995. 
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8. The plaintiff shall maintain the insurances for medical 
and dental coverage as it may be made available to him through his 
employment. The insurance coverage as presently to be maintained 
by the defendant is through COBRA at a cost of approximately 
$400.00 per month for and on behalf of the parties' minor children. 
The responsibility of the any insurance premium shall be determined 
at the August 10, 1995 hearing. Each party shall pay one-half 
(1/2) of all reasonable and necessary non-covered medical, dental, 
orthodontic, optical and prescription costs which are incurred on 
behalf of the parties/ minor children. If the defendant has 
available to her through any employment which she obtains insurance 
coverage for and on behalf of the parties7 minor children then she 
shall provide the same. 
9. All of the matters are reserved and shall be adjudicated 
by the court on August 10, 1995 at 8:00 a.m. 
DATED this 3/ day of July, 1995. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, by hand delivering the same in a sealed envelope, this 
^ffl^day of July, 1995 to the following: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
426 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(Leslie Frederick 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
COPY OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
DATED NOVEMBER 7. 1995 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 7 1995 
By. T ' bup«-itv Clerk 
RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00 
Fax: (801) 539-8236 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
££Oi8^?> 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 944902846DA 
Judge David S. Young 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for final adjudication of 
various matters on August 10, 1995, the Honorable David S. Young 
presiding. The plaintiff was presented and represented by his 
attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The defendant was present and 
represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann. The court 
having taken additional testimony and arguments from counsel. 
Based upon such and for good cause appearing herein the court makes 
these its: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Each of the parties are fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the care, custody and control of the parties7 minor 
children, and an award of joint custody is appropriate, with the 
residential custody to be with the mother • The court has 
determined in weighing the factors as set forth in Rule 4-903 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration and the other factors as 
presented to the court at trial that it would be in the best 
interest of the children to be with the defendant • The factors 
weighed include: 
a. The preference of the children with respect to each 
parent is comparable; 
b. The court view that it is preferable to keep siblings 
together, including half siblings, and this weighs normally in 
favor of the defendant. The court cautions against the older half-
siblings not straining the relationship with the plaintiff, and if 
there is inappropriate action between the older half-siblings and 
the younger children of this marriage, then that may be a factor in 
future events weighing in favor of changing custody, but at present 
it is not a factor; 
c. The children have bonds with both of the parents; 
d. The factors of previous custody are neutral in this 
case. The defendant had been the primary caretaker up until the 
separation of the parties, and the children have also done well in 
the temporary custody of the plaintiff. In addition, there are 
better accommodations in the home with the defendant, and the 
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children are familiar with that neighborhood where the defendant 
resides; 
e. With respect to the moral character and emotional 
stability of the parties, this factor weighs in favor of the 
plaintiff. Each of the parents have a strong desire for custody, 
and the duration and desire for custody is comparable. Prior to 
the separation the children were most likely bonded more closely to 
the defendant; 
f. The parties' religious compatibility with the 
children is appropriate and comparable though the plaintiff has 
shown a little stronger devotion in this area; 
g. The financial circumstances of the parties weighs in 
favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has better earnings, but 
appears to be passing much of the responsibility for the care of 
the children in the home environment to his mother. Parents are 
preferred over the grandparents for the care of the children; 
h. The most compelling factor weighing in favor of the 
defendant is a stronger willingness on the part of the defendant to 
see that visitation continues with the other parent. The court 
believes that it is very appropriate that each of the parties 
maintain their substantial relationship with the children, 
including substantial time with the children. The court found no 
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indication of interference with parental contact on the part of the 
defendant. 
2. Income is to be imputed to the defendant in the amount of 
$731.00 per month and to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,800.00 
per month. Based upon such the defendant is to receive child 
support from the plaintiff in the amount of $753.00. 
3. Because of the high costs of insurance premiums the same 
should not be required to be maintained at present. 
4. The plaintiff is presently living with his parents and as 
a result of the same his costs for housing and food and related 
expenses are not as great as those of the defendant. As 
plaintiff's circumstances change his payments for alimony as are 
required herein shall be re-evaluated. 
5. Based upon the plaintiff's present living conditions he 
has an ability to pay and the defendant has a need for alimony 
therefore, plaintiff should pay to the defendant the sum of $400.00 
per month as alimony which shall terminate upon the first of the 
following conditions to occur: 
a) Defendant's remarriage. 
b) Defendant's co-habitation. 
c) Death of either party. 
d) For a period of time no longer than the length of the 
marriage which was nine (9) years. 
e) As plaintiff's circumstances may change and warrant re-
evaluation. 
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6. The defendant shall be responsible for the house payment 
and all obligations owing upon the home and to hold the plaintiff 
harmless from the same. 
7. The defendant is awarded the 1990 Ford van together with 
the obligation upon said automobile and she is to hold the 
plaintiff harmless from the same. 
8. Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs 
incurred herein. 
9. The joint marital obligations that were incurred during 
the marriage shall be required to be paid jointly by the parties 
which includes to Colonial Bank of approximately $2,000.00 for spa 
membership and Individual BankCard VISA of approximately $1,300.00 
for counseling. Any obligations that were incurred solely by that 
party since the time of separation shall be borne by that party and 
they are to hold the other harmless from the same. 
10. It is appropriate that the defendant reimburse the 
plaintiff $1,000.00 for her share of the costs of the custody 
evaluation. 
11. It is appropriate that the plaintiff be awarded open, 
liberal and flexible visitation to the parties' minor children. 
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The parties are awarded the joint custody of the parties' 
minor children with residential custody being with the defendant. 
2. The parties shall exchange information concerning the 
health, education and welfare of the children and where possible, 
confer before making decisions concerning these areas. 
3. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant a child support 
in the amount of $752.00 per month. 
4. Until such time that insurance coverage is obtained as a 
benefit of employment of either of the parties then neither party 
is required at this time to maintain health and dental insurance on 
behalf of the parties' minor children. If either party has 
available to them at reasonable cost health and dental insurance on 
behalf of the parties' minor children then they shall be required 
to provide the same and any premium costs that are incurred on 
behalf of the parties' minor children shall be borne equally by the 
parties. Each of the parties shall be responsible to pay one-half 
(1/2) of all non-covered medical, dental, orthodontic, prescription 
and optical expenses that are incurred on behalf of the parties' 
minor children*. 
5. The plaintiff shall be awarded open, liberal and flexible 
visitation to the parties' minor children which shall be at a 
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minimum as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-3 5 however 
said weekend visitation as provided pursuant to said statute is 
modified such that the plaintiff would have the children from 
Thursday through Sunday rather than the Friday through Sunday as 
provided in said schedule and one evening each week. Each of the 
parties will be awarded one-half (1/2) of the children's off-track 
time periods from school. 
Any day care that is necessary on behalf of either party is to 
be first offered to the other parent before seeking third party day 
care. 
6. Each party shall be required to pay one-half (1/2) of all 
work related day care expense as are incurred on behalf of the 
parties' minor children. 
7. The plaintiff is to pay to the defendant alimony in the 
amount of $400.00 per month and continuing thereafter until 
terminated by the first of the following conditions to occur: 
a) Defendants remarriage 
b) Defendants co-habitation 
c) Death of either party 
d) For a period of time no longer than the length of the 
marriage of nine (9) years 
e) As plaintiffs circumstances may change and warrant re-
evaluation. 
8. The defendant is required to pay the mortgages owing upon 
the parties' home and to hold the plaintiff harmless from the same. 
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9. The defendant is awarded the 1990 Ford van and she is 
required to make all payments upon the same and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless the said obligations. 
10. The parties are to jointly pay any and all debts and 
obligations that were incurred by them during the course of the 
marriage, which includes Colonial Bank of approximately $2,000.00 
and Individual BankCard VISA of approximately $1,300.00 for 
counseling. 
11. Each party is required to pay any and all debts which 
were incurred by that party since the date of separation and to 
hold the other harmless from the same. 
12. The defendant is required to pay to the plaintiff 
$1,000.00 as her share of the custody evaluation. 
13. The plaintiff is awarded the two youngest children of the 
parties for all tax purposes. If defendant would receive a benefit 
by claiming on child for tax purposes she may do the same however 
the plaintiff may purchase the exemption from defendant by paying 
to defendant the difference between claiming and not claiming the 
child. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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14. Each party shall bear and be responsible for their own 
attorneys fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this _ 2 ^ 7 d a Y of J5fe£3£er7 1995. 
BY THE COURT:^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER, by hand 
delivering the same in a sealed envelope, this day of 
October, 1995 to the following: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
426 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
dtf^Atd/ittff 
ies l ie Frederick 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DATED DECEMBER 6, 1995 
MITCHELL J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 3845 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC HUGH HOGAN, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 944902846 DA 
MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN, : 
Defendant. : Judge David S. Young 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ERIC HUGH HOGAN, the above-
named plaintiff, by and through MITCHELL J. OLSEN of Olsen & 
Olsen, L.L.C., hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the 
final Supplemental Findings of Fact and Order of the Honorable 
David S. Young dated November 7, 1995. The appeal is taken 
from such part of the order that states that: 
1. The parties are awarded the joint custody of 
the parties' minor children with residential custody 
being with the defendant. 
2. That plaintiff shall pay to the defendant 
child support in the amount of $752.00 per month. 
3. That plaintiff is to pay to the defendant 
alimony in the amount of 400.00 per month and con-
tinuing thereafter until terminated by the first of 
the following conditions to occur: 
a. defendant's remarriage; 
b. defendant's cohabitation; 
c. death of either party; 
d. for a period of time no longer than the 
length of the marriage or nine (9) years; or 
e. as plaintiff's circumstances may change and 
warrant re-evaluation. 
DATED this ^  1 day of December, 1995. 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
By: 
MITCHELL J. OLSE^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the (J) day of December, 1995, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL 
to the following with postage prepaid thereon: 
Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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